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Abstract 
The debate on the effect of democracy on economic growth has been comprehensively growing since 1980s in theoretical and 
empirical literature. The existing literature provides conflicting views of this relationship. For this reason, the aim of this paper is 
therefore to empirically investigate this relationship in 17 MENA countries over the period 1983-2012. We explore this 
relationship by using fixed (FE)/random (RE) effects and generalized method of moments (GMM) system approaches. We show 
that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous. The major empirical is that democracy, measured by Institutionalized Democracy 
Score, Institutionalized Autocracy Score, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment and 
Executive Constraints have a robust and negative impact on growth in MENA countries.  
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of WCES 2014. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The study of the relationship between democracy versus authoritarian regimes and economic growth has known 
a peak during these last decades. Democracy was seen as the process of demilitarization in emerging countries in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, and the concept today is popularly identified with such features like freedom, equality, 
progress and modernity. Referring to El-Rufa'i (2003), democracy is defined as a political system in which attempts 
are made to frame rules that maximize the well-being of people. Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (2002) defined 
democracy as follows: “…whether a country has checks and balances on executive powers, constitutional processes 
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and guarantees, freedom of the press and the absence of censorship, clear and effective judicial and legal 
structures, incumbent term limits, and transparency, openness and citizen input in policymaking”. In this paper, we 
investigate analytically and empirically whether economic growth is ameliorated or no by democracy. Last 
decencies, there’s a surge of corpus of studies in the relationship between democracy and growth conducted, but 
conclusions remain mixed (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Przeworski et al., 2000; Krieckhaus, 2004; Brown and 
Mobarak, 2009; Chowdhury, 2012; Aisen and Veiga, 2013). This article challenges this consensus.  Since the 17th 
century, democracy can stimulate economic growth. Economic growth requires what Sklar (1987) calls 
“developmental democracy” in which legal and electoral limits on arbitrary power give individuals the security to 
plan for their economic futures. This finding is consistent with the notion that democracy promotes economic 
growth. Kurzman et al. (2002) point out that democracy affects economic growth through many channels like 
investment (crucial ingredient for economic growth), State Expenditure and Social Unrest. Rock (2009) and Knutsen 
(2013) find a robust and positive effect of democracy on economic growth. In contrast, others points of views, like 
You (2011), concludes that democracy has a negative impact on growth. He shows that democracy increases the 
level of corruption and consequently affects negatively the rate of economic growth. Aisen and Veiga (2013) 
confirm this negative effect of democracy on growth. Other studies have found no relationship between democracy 
and growth. Narayan et al. (2011) find that the increase in democracy has a negative effect on real income. We 
conclude that there is no consensus on this issue. This study contributes to the exiting literature by determining the 
relationship between democracy and growth by two aspects: Firstly, few scientific papers treat this relationship only 
in the theorical framework. Secondly, no scientific papers treat this relationship in the MENA region. Finally, 
previous studies had found that the nexus democracy-growth is mixed. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: 
Section 2 presents a brief survey of related literature. Section 3 outlines empirical models introduced data, retained 
variables, econometric approaches and provides results. Concluding remarks are in Section 4.  
 
2. Review of related literature      
 
The last two decades, many countries introduced many reforms to enhance democracy. Przeworski and Limongi 
(1993) point out that: “we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders growth”. Brunetti (1997) examined 17 
studies about the relationship between democracy and economic growth and found 9 studies report no relationship, 
one study a positive, one study a negative, 3 studies a fragile negative relationship and three studies a fragile 
positive relationship between democracy and economic growth. There is no consensus on this relationship. 
Democracy is good for investment and has a positive indirect effect on economic growth. Investment will grow in a 
climate of liberty, free-flowing information, and property rights secure from the arbitrary power of the state. Tavares 
and Wacziang (2001), using simultaneous equation framework in a panel of 65 industrial and developing countries 
over the period 1970-1989, find that democracy fosters growth by improving the accumulation of human capital 
and, by lowering income inequality. For Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), democratic transitions are 
subsequently associated with a higher growth rate of real per capita income. Benhabib et al. (2003) Knutsen (2013) 
confirm this conclusion. Profeta et al. (2013) conclude that the relation between democracy and growth is somewhat 
reinforced, at least in the countries under consideration like Latin America and South-East Asia and European 
Union.  Hellmanzik (2013) introduces a new channel to test the impact of democracy on growth: creative production 
-by using a historic, high-frequency dataset on the value of modern art products. He concludes that democracy has a 
significant positive impact both on the density of superstar painters and the collective artistic human capital in a 
country. Jong-A-Pin (2009), using a factor analysis to examine the effect of 25 political instability indicators and 
their effect on economic growth, points out that higher degrees of instability of the political regime lead to lower 
economic growth. This conclusion is in total concordance of findings of Alesina and Perotti (1996) that find socio-
political instability generates an uncertain politico-economic environment, raising risks and reducing investment. 
Bjørnskov (2010) has struggled the importance of democratic process in attracting foreign aid that creates economic 
growth.  Knutsen (2011) finds a very robust evidence for a positive, and quite substantial, effect of Proportional 
Representation electoral rules on economic growth because presidentialism systems promotes broad-interest-, rather 
than special interest, policies and produces credible economic policies. More recently, on a sample of 169 countries 
over the period 1960- 2004, Aisen and Veiga (2013) find that higher degrees of political instability are associated 
with lower growth rates of economic growth because instability negatively affects physical and human capital 
accumulation. Also, they conclude that only economic freedom and ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to economic 
growth. Another idea of the positive effect of democracy on growth is that democratic regimes spend less on the 
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military, and thus promote economic growth. However, autocracies regimes spend more on the military, raise taxes 
to pay for these expenditures, and thereby reduce economic growth. Derived from the liberal tradition and the 
recent Marxist literature on class compromise, democracy can stimulates economic growth by providing formal 
channels for the expression of grievances (Kurzman et al., 2002). In contrast, Tavares and Wacziang (2001), in a 
panel of 65 industrial and developing countries over the period 1970-1989, conclude that democracy hinders growth 
by reducing the rate of physical capital accumulation and by raising the ratio of government consumption to GDP. 
Kurzman et al. (2002) affirm that democracy is an obstacle for promoting investment- the single strongest predictor 
of economic growth – because Democracies regimes dare not impose unpopular measures to increase investment but 
only an authoritarian regime will be able to do so. Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) conclude that democracy’s 
net effect on the economy does not seem to be detrimental. Democracy does not have a direct impact on economic 
growth but positive indirect effects through higher human capital, lower inflation, lower political instability, and 
higher levels of economic freedom. Tanga and Yung (2008), using ARDL model in eight Asian economies, show 
that democratization significantly affects growth, but the effect is not consistent and not robust. They, also, find a 
statistically significant long-run relationship running from democratization to growth, which can be either positive 
or negative. Yang (2008), based on empirical analysis for a sample of 138 countries over the 1968–2002 period, 
concludes that in countries with high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity, democracy appears to significantly reduce 
growth volatility and  in countries with low degrees of ethnic diversity such a relationship is not significant. Collier 
and Hoeffler (2009) found, that in developing countries, the combination of resource rents and democracy 
(measured by Polity IV) has been significantly growth-reducing. Narayan et al. (2011) and  Aisen and Veiga (2013) 
confirm this negative effect of democracy on growth. Among others, Knutsen (2011), conducted an interesting study 
on a sample of 100 countries over the period 1820-2002, concludes that there is no robust effect of presidentialism 
or parliamentarism on growth and plural-majoritarian systems produce lower economic growth than both 
presidentialism and semi- presidentialism systems.  
 
3. Empirical study 
 
The economic growth–democracy correlation is the cornerstone of the ‘‘modernization theory’’.The empirical 
association is more robust than the theoretical literature. Several studies support this hypothesis. The model to be 
tested is the following: 
 
         (1) 
 
Where: GROWTH is the GDP per capita growth. INF denotes annual change in consumer price index (CPI). Trade 
is Import plus export divided to GDP. POP is the Growth rate of total population. GOVTSIZE is the Ratio of 
Government final consumption to GDP. For democracy, we use 5 measures*: Institutionalized Democracy Score 
(democ), Institutionalized Autocracy Score (autoc), Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (xrcomp), Openness 
of Executive Recruitment (xropen) and Executive Constraints (xconst).  Data cover the 1983-2012 periods, taken 
from the World Bank (World Development Indicators) for macroeconomic variables and from Integrated Network 
for Societal Conflict Research for democracy variables. The empirical study is based on a sample of 17 countries in 
the MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt Arab Rep, Irak, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. Table 1 presents the 
estimation results of the Fixed/Random effects regressions that include democracy variables after controlling for 
other growth determinants.  
 
Table 1: Democracy and Growth: Random effect (RE)/ Fixed effect (FE) approaches Fixed effect (FE) 
 
 
* For more details see Marshall et al. (2013) 
       democ              autoc           xrcomp          xropen            xconst 
GOVTSIZE     -0.199             -0.202             -0.201     -0.201    -0.200 
      (1.68)*  (1.67)* (1.63) (1.63) (1.63)* 
INF     -0.422            -0.427             -0.425            -0.425             -0.425 
     (2.25)** (2.26)** (2.25)** (2.25)** (2.25)** 
ititGROWTH HEEEEE   DEMOCRACY  +POP + GOVTSIZE  +TRADE + INF it5it4it3it2it1
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Random effect (RE) 
GOVTSIZE         -0.011 -0.008         -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 (1.68)** (2.11) (2.15)** (2.15)** (2.16)** 
INF -0.105 -0.150         -0.125 -0.121 -0.120 
 (2.36)** (1.67)* (2.43)** (2.41)** (2.41)** 
POP 0.248 0.250   0.253 0.267 0.255 
 (1.80)* (1.78)* (1.81)* (1.85)* (1.82*) 
TRADE 0.409 0.401 0.408 0.404 0.411 
 (2.26)** (2.15)** (2.24)** (2.23)** (2.27)** 
Democracy -0.027 -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.030 
 (1.79)** (1.69)** (2.44)** (2.46) (2.45)** 
Constant 1.100 1.285 1.107 1.119 1.152 
 (0.64) (0.74) (0.64) (0.65) (0.68) 
N 351 351 351 351 351 
Hausman χ2 12.51 10.48 11.64 11.68 11.98 
P-value  0.0284 0.0428 0.400 0.0394 0.0351 
 
 
 
Table 2: Democracy and Growth: GMM in system approach 
          democ           autoc        xrcomp          xropen          xconst 
L. growth -0.200 -0.194 -0.195 -0.197 -0.198 
 (2.08)** (2.06)** (2.06)** (2.06)** (2.08)** 
GOVTSIZE -0.235 -0.208 -0.237 -0.227 -0.237 
 (2.28)** (2.27)** (2.29)** (1.28) (1.79)* 
INF 0.273 0.271 0.267 0.266 0.271 
 (2.29)** (2.29)** (2.29)** (2.29)** (2.29)** 
POP 15.551 15.503 15.541 15.561 15.594 
 (1.88)* (1.93)* (1.90)* (1.91)* (1.89)* 
TRADE -2.409 -2.482 -2.451 -2.478 -2.434 
 (2.39)** (2.41)** (1.68)* (2.40)** (0.39) 
Democracy -0.088 -0.083 -0.090 -0.086 -0.088 
 (3.98)*** (1.98)** (2.00)** (2.09)** (0.98) 
N 
AR (2) 
P-value 
Hansen 
P-value 
Wald χ2 
339 
1.40 
0.160 
12.06 
0.969 
18.93*** 
339 
1.42 
0.156 
12.08 
0.969 
18.84*** 
339 
1.41 
0.160 
12.06 
0.970 
18.86*** 
339 
1.41 
0.160 
12.06 
0.969 
18.76*** 
339 
1.41 
0.160 
12.06 
0.969 
18.89*** 
Note: Estimation method is the GMM in system with robust standard errors. AB test AR (2) refers to the Arellano–Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation). Hansen:  test for validity of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as 
indicated under null. This test of over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically distributed as χ² under the null of instrument validity. The 
numbers in parentheses are absolute value of t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
 
The empirical investigation includes five regressions with five different proxies for democracy in order to trace 
any impact of democracy on growth. For all models, the Hausman test also confirms the appropriateness of the 
fixed-based effects estimation procedure used in this study (P-value of Hausman statistics are lower than 5%).  The 
coefficient on democracy is negative and statistically significant for all measures of democracy except for Openness 
of Executive Recruitment (xropen). Our findings point to clear evidence that democracy have a negative impact on 
economic growth in MENA countries. Our result is consistent with previous literature (Tavares and Wacziang 2001; 
Kurzman et al. 2002; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008; Tanga and Yung 2008; Yang 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 
2009; Narayan et al. 2011; Aisen and Veiga 2013). The negative impact of decomcracy on growth can be explained 
POP     -0.853             -0.975              -0.886             -0.888             -0.866 
     (2.34)** (0.39)               (2.35)** (2.35)** (2.34)** 
TRADE      0.519              0.539               0.530               0.527              0.532 
                 (2.48)** (2.51)**               (2.60)*** (1.69)* (2.59)* 
Democracy                -0.009              -0.017              -0.013             -0.013 -0.012 
                 (2.29)** (2.54)**                (2.39)** (0.39) (1.82)* 
Constant                  7.504               7.917                7.593 7.622 7.556 
                  (1.02)      (1.07)               (1.04) (1.04) (1.03) 
R2                    0.02 0.02                 0.02 0.02 0.02 
N                    351 351 351 351 351 
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by the very low level of democracy.  Lebanon, Morocco and Turkey have the highest level of democracy in MENA 
region. Tunisia and Egypt are partly democratic. The remaining countries are categorized as authoritarian regimes. 
Freedom House categorises MENA countries as “Not Free” except for Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Turkey and 
Israel. In some Presidential republics, like Tunisia and Algeria, there is elections but there are many critics. For 
Absolute Monarchy, like Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordon and United Arab Emirates, the level of 
democracy is lower but the growth rate is higher. In Islamic governments, like Turkey that has the highest rate of 
growth last decency, the political party Justice and Development is a moderate democratic party.   Also, the political 
instability, after events of the Arab Spring such as Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, in many countries in MENA region 
negatively impacts investment and consequently the growth rate. For example, Libya’s economy contracted by more 
than 60% in 2011, but it’s expected to recoup some of those losses in 2012 with an astonishing annual growth rate of 
nearly 70%. In the short-run, the growth rate for new democracies (Tunisia; Egypt) is lower than the period before 
democratic election in 2011 because there were no viable institutions that governed business people before the 
Revolution of 2011. There is now a dynamic move of democracy in Tunisia and Egypt.  Those new democracies are 
working on policy reform and reforming institutions to support the democratic transition. For robustness test and to 
extract consistent estimates, we use the GMM in system approach. This methodology takes into account the 
endogeneity, the GMM in system uses as instruments lagged values of the variable. Table 2 presents the estimation 
results of the GMM in system regressions. For the 5 models, the Hansen and serial-correlation tests do not reject the 
null hypothesis of correct specification (P-values of Hansen test and AR (2) test of Arellano and Bond are larger 
than 5%), lending support to our estimation results. The low p-values for the Wald tests suggest that all models are 
well specified and fit the data. The reported coefficients estimates are similar to the results issued from fixed effect 
approach.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
This paper attempts to answer the question of whether democracy can stimulate economic growth. Using a panel 
of 17 MENA countries for the period 1983-2012, this paper highlights the impact of democracy on economic 
growth. Our main results can be summed up as follows. First, within RE/FE, we find that the effect of democracy on 
economic growth is negative and statistically significant for four measures of democracy. Second, within GMM in 
system, we find the same conclusion. All MENA countries must strengthen institutions. Many countries are working 
to upgrade democratic accountability and reduce corruption and external conflicts because a well-functioning 
political system can positively contribute to higher rate of economic growth. Economic growth requires a long-term 
protection of civil and political freedoms. To enhance academic understanding of this subject, this research can be 
extended by introducing other determinants of democracy and other econometric frameworks (Panel data 
Cointegration, PSTR) because a sound well-functioning democracy regime can positively leads to provide sustained 
economic growth after the series of revolution in some countries. 
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